

Report No. FAA-CT-81-60





# DISCRETE ADDRESS BEACON SYSTEM (DABS)

SOFTWARE SYSTEM

# RELIABILITY MODELING AND PREDICTION

EVALUATION ASSOCIATES, INC. GSB BLDG., 1 BELMONT AVE. BALA CYNWYD, PA. 19004

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
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16. Abstract

This report contains the results of a pilot study accomplished to demonstrate the ability to determine the magnitude of software reliability encountered in large-scale computer-based equipment. The engineering model of the Discrete Address Reacon System (DABS) currently undergoing development was used as the subject. Based on software failure and test time data, a software reliability model was developed for the engineering model of DABS and used to measure software reliability and its growth during the debugging process. The software reliability model was merged with the hardware reliability model into a DABS system model suitable for prediction. The Mean Time Between Failures (MTBF) determined by this study applies only to an early version of the software associated with the engineering model of the DABS. The report also includes recommendations for the specification of software reliability and the modification to the failure reporting system.

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#### 1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY.

#### 1.1 OBJECTIVE.

The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) uses mathematical models to measure and predict the reliability of hardware. FAA engineering specifications for systems under development contain reliability requirements, usually in terms of mean-time-between-failures (MTBF), for the hardware portions of these systems. However, recently procured systems contain computers with copious amounts of software. It has been the experience of the data processing community that failures of such systems are not confined to hardware. Software which has been debugged and in use for many years has been known to cause system failure. Consequently the FAA initiated this pilot study to determine the magnitude of the software reliability problem in one system currently in development. Study objectives were the following:

- Develop a software reliability model for the Discrete Address Beacon System (DABS) and make a software reliability prediction.
- Review and critique the available hardware reliability model and the hardware reliability prediction for DABS.
- Integrate/evolve the software and hardware reliability models into a DABS system model and make a system reliability prediction.
- Compare the predicted systems reliability value versus the specified value. Make applicable recommendations for reliability improvement of the system.
- Recommend a software reliability failure reporting system for the DABS.

#### 1.2 BACKGROUND.

The objectives cited above were accomplished by grouping related objectives and tasks according to importance as defined by Mr. G. Apostolakis, head of the Reliability Engineering Section at the FAA Technical Center. As stated by Mr. Apostolakis, the primary concern of the FAA is the study of DABS software reliability—how it could be measured, modeled, predicted and how it could be incorporated with the hardware into an integrated software/hardware reliability model for DABS. The results of this study are contained in the body of this report, Sections 2 through 5. Of secondary concern are 1) the review and critique of the DABS hardware reliability model and prediction, and 2) a recommended software reliability failure reporting system for

the DABS. A brief critique of the DABS hardware reliability model is contained in Appendix A to this report. Because the FAA already has a failure reporting system for DABS software, a review of the procedures and forms was made. Recommendations for improvement are contained in Appendix B to this report.

The DABS software reliability was modeled using test time and failure data obtained from the testing of the sensors at three test sites—FAA Technical Center, Elwood and Clementon, N.J. Based on tests conducted between February 1979 and June 1980, reliability measurements were made for nine software modules which comprise the DABS mission software. Maintenance and off—line software were not modeled. Also not modeled was the Automatic Traffic Advisory and Resolution Service (ATARS) module because of its interim status.

Reliability prediction models for software modules were derived and then verified by matching predictions of error rate with software test data collected during July, August and September of 1980. Measurements of software reliability obtained from the models were combined with hardware reliability predictions (prepared by FAA) to obtain an integrated DABS reliability prediction model.

Infortunately, there is no concensus in the literature pertaining to the definitions of commonly used terms such as bugs, errors, faults and failures. A few definitions are presented here to provide the reader some insight into those terms and concepts of software relibility.

- Software bugs, errors and faults will be considered to be synonymous. They denote latent defects present in software due to coding errors, misunderstanding of the required logic on the part of the programmer, incorrect algorithms or other programming errors.
- A software failure occurs when certain combinations of input parameters, input commands, input options or input data exercise the defective part of the program. Under a large variety of circumstances, one may consider these inputs to be random sets from all possible inputs. These random sets of inputs, in turn, cause random failures in the corresponding outputs. The random output failures may be analyzed statistically and thus constitute the basis for the concept of reliability as applied to software failures.
- Software reliability is the probability that a given software program will operate without failure for a specified time in a specified environment.

#### 1.3 SIGNIFICANT FINDINGS.

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1. The DABS has a measured overall MTBF of 252 hours; 575 hours MTBF for the hardware and 448 hours for the software. Only critical failures, those which dramatically reduce system capability, were counted in computing the MTBFs of hardware and software.

This achieved MTBF is far short of the 1000-hour MTBF specified in the engineering requirements. It is recognized that the required MTBF of 1000 hours was intended for application only to hardware, but even if the software is ignored the system does not now meet its reliability requirement. If all chargeable software failures were included in the calculation, software MTBF would decrease to 81 hours and the system MTBF would decrease to 71 hours. These measurements are based on a total of 5386 software test hours during which 354 errors were observed and evaluated.

It should be recognized that DABS is undergoing development testing and that its reliability is expected to increase as improvements are incorporated. Also, the transition from a test or debugging scenario to an operational scenario should noticeably improve the measured MTBF of the software. Much of the software testing at the Technical Center was geared toward pushing the system to its specified operational limits (e.g.,Capacity testing, multiple correlations, crossing tracks). The system was tested using a multitude of input environments and many of the reported errors were discovered as a result of testing using input environments which would not ordinarily be encountered in an operational scenario.

2. A critical software failure will frequently have a far greater effect on system operation than a computer hardware failure because critical software failures cause a significant or complete loss of system capability; that is, they defeat the hardware redundancy built into the system. In the event of computer failure the system can recover by using a spare computer; however, critical software failures result in either complete system failure or reduced performance which does not meet specification. From a reliability point of view, partial system operation is considered to be a failed condition because no reliability requirements are specified for alternate (degraded) modes of operation.

It is recommended that the FAA investigate the design of fault-tolerant software for DABS. The software could be designed to sense critical software failures (watchdog logic or audits) which would recover the system in much the same fashion as a computer failure by causing an automatic re-initialization of the system.

3. The Duane reliability growth model which has been used extensively to model the growth of hardware reliability and more recently to model the growth of software reliability as well, fits the known history of DABS software. Of the nine software modules in DABS, the Duane model accurately predicts reliability and rate of reliability growth of five modules. The modules and their rate of reliability growth models are:

Communication:  $\lambda_{\Sigma} = .174 \text{ T}^{-.503}$ Measured MTBF at end of study: 976 hours

Performance Monitoring:  $\lambda_{\Sigma}$  = .1403 T<sup>-.419</sup> Measured MTBF at end of study: 494 hours

Message Routing & Data Link:  $\lambda_{\Sigma}$  = .3467 T -.645 Measured MTBF at end of study: 2400 hours

System Software:  $\lambda_{\Sigma} = 5.689 \text{ T}^{-.863}$  Measured MTBF at end of study: 2588 hours

Surveillance:  $\lambda_{\Sigma}$  = .1067 T<sup>-.3071</sup> Measured MTBF at end of study: 207 hours

where  $\lambda \chi$  = cumulative error rate (number of chargeable errors/total test hours) and T = cumulative test hours. Of the remaining modules, the data were either too sparse to evaluate the parameters of the model or too erratic to determine whether module reliability is improving.

The parameters appearing as exponents of T indicate the rate of MTBF growth (MTBF = 1/error rate), which is usually a measure of management pressure to find and correct errors. The rates shown are all within the range typically encountered but they vary more than usual. This suggests that testing, debugging and integration efforts have not been applied uniformly in the DABS program. Some modules have received much more attention than others.

4. Based on hardware reliability measurements reported in Report No. FAA-RD-80-36, "Discrete Address Beacon System (DABS) Baseline Test and Evaluation," April 1980, DABS hardware MTBF growth rate, albeit using a small sample, was calculated to be  $\alpha=.36$ . Projections of hardware MTBF improvement using  $\alpha=.36$  and software MTBF improvement using  $\alpha=.52$  show that the DABS software/hardware system will achieve its 1000-hour MTBF requirement after 49 additional months of testing. At that time hardware MTBF will be approximately 1650 hours and software MTBF will be approximately 2500 hours if the growth rate requirement.

The models predict that if no changes are made in the present reliability improvement efforts, software errors will still constitute 10 percent of total system errors (based on 1000-hour hardware MTBF) after  $50 \times 10^6$  software test hours (test time needed to achieve software MTBF = 10,000 hours).

The following actions are recommended to speed up the reliability improvement of the DABS system:

- Increase the intensity of the software test program to conduct well planned non-random testing such as the identification and evaluation of degraded as well as complex inputs to software modules.
- Automatically identify/isolate access of the code with low input/output traffic; check all jump statements.

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- Conduct failure modes, effects and criticality analyses of hardware elements which contribute most to unreliability--antenna, transmitter, receiver and processor. These elements which have no redundancy in the single channel sensor could be improved through the idenfication of failure modes and their elimination through corrective action.
- The reliability engineering department of the FAA Technical Center should continue to monitor the progress of the software test, participate in configuration management and include estimates of software reliability in DABS predictions.
- 5. Analysis of the test data for the purpose of measuring reliability and its growth showed that the error rates of most software modules changed appreciably during the test. Several causes are postulated:
- a) As noted in Figure 4, the nearly constant error rate of the communication module for 900 test hours is followed by a rapidly declining error rate. This pattern is characteristic of an early test period in which the software package was not tested with the intensity needed to identify and correct errors. Subsequent testing then resulted in the identification and elimination of more errors at a significantly higher rate.
- b) Software test personnel are sometimes reluctant to document errors as they are observed because they believe that continuation of the test and analyses of results are more important tasks. Consequently, failures may be documented en masse several weeks or months after they occur, usually at the completion of the test. Such perturbations to the model may require several additional data points to effect smoothing.

- c) Neither the Duane nor any other model which assumes a continuously decreasing error rate with time can predict significantly large perturbations due to mass introductions of software modifications at "release" points. These can either increase or decrease an error rate. Abrupt termination of a debugging process will also significantly reduce the observed error rate.
- 6. The FAA should endeavor to include software as well as hardware elements in future reliability models for DABS and other computer aided systems. Reliability requirements of future systems, which are often set by systems requirements analyses, should also include the reliability of the software. Measured reliability of the system will then be realistic since it will apply to software and hardware.

#### DESCRIPTION OF DABS COMPUTER SOFTWARE, TESTING AND DATA BASE.

#### 2.1 DESCRIPTION OF DABS COMPUTER SOFTWARE AND ITS TESTING.

As described by Dr. C. M. Applewhite in "Disbributed Computer Architecture For The Discrete Address Beacon System," the purpose of DABS is to provide highly reliable tracking and collision avoidance support for DABS-equipped aircraft. Control of DABS is provided by software operating in a ground based distributed computer network interfaced to a beacon radar. Each DABS aircraft is assigned a unique identification (discrete address) associated with its DABS transponder. Recognition of a beacon interrogation is keyed to the discrete address of each particular aircraft such that a unique data link with miminum interference can be established between the computer network and each aircraft. The software subsystem maintains a track update on each aircraft, predicts potential conflict situations and controls the scheduling of the beacon radar. Data to support aircraft tracking is gathered via uplink interrogations and downlink responses of aircraft positional data. Traffic data and maneuver advisories are provided to the pilots via the uplink in the event the computer subsystem predicts a potential conflict situation. Telephone line data links between sensors facilitate coordination among adjacent sensors with overlapping airspace responsibilities.

DABS surveillance capability is designed to be completely compatible with the present Air Traffic Control Radar Beacon System (ATCRBS) and thus can be introduced gradually and economically without major operational or procedural change. Since DABS uses monopulse direction finding, the system also provides improved surveillance coverage for ATCRBS equipped aircraft at a reduced interrogation rate.

In addition to the requirements given above, the software system is required to respond to computer hardware failures by reconfiguring the system and maintaining system integrity, to monitor system status indicators, to send status messages to ATC maintenance facilities and to collect performance data for the sensor. A functional block diagram which highlights some of the DABS features is shown in Figure 1. The architecturally distributed, molecular software is shown in Figure 2.

No special tests were run expressly to provide data, solely for reliability analysis. Consequently, the running time and errors generated during debugging, checkout and operation of the DABS sensors at FAA Technical Center, Elwood and Clementon, N.J., were used to formulate the software reliability model and measure achieved reliability and growth rate. The DABS software was tested formally and informally. At the FAA Technical Center, initial testing was conducted by running




Figure 1. DABS Functional Block Diagram




Figure 2. DABS Software Independent Task/Processor Organization

the system. Maximum specified values of targets and fruit rates (replies to interrogations from other sensors) were simulated to test DABS software and hardware. The test program uncovered coding errors, timing and interrupt faults.

#### 2.2 DABS SOFTWARE DATA BASE.

The software test time base is shown in Figure 3. The figure contains monthly estimates of software test time for three facilities where testing occurred—FAA Technical Center, Elwood and Clementon, NJ. Beginning in October 1979 the test time is the scheduled software test time for each test site. Prior to October, software test times were based on estimates obtained from Messrs. M. Holtz, DABS Program Manager, and J. Simpfenderfer, T. I. Technical Representative. The figure also shows the time phasing of the testing of the various DABS software modules. It shows, for example, that channel management, surveillance and data extraction were considered to be undergoing test from the beginning of the test, whereas network management was not tested until all three sensors were on—line in October 1979.

An additional three months of test data (1790 hours) accrued during July, August, and September 1980. This time period constituted a small controlled sample from DABS testing to be used to verify reliability predictions made using the data base described above. This procedure is described in Section 3 of this report.

Software errors discovered during the test programs were reported on trouble reports. A brief description of the reporting system, including a sample form, is given in Appendix B to this report.

The DABS software error data base consists of 354 trouble reports (TR) which document program stops, errors, enhancements and change proposals. Not all supply adequate information for reliability analysis. Software design engineers at Texas Instruments reviewed each TR and its associated follow-up documentation and classified the TRs with respect to severity. Chargeable errors which were used to measure software reliability were classified as critical (1) or non-critical (2). Those not chargeable were classified other (3) or no count (4). The following definitions were applied.

#### Chargeable Errors:

- 1. Critical An error in the software which causes a significant or total loss of operational system capability.
- 2. Non-Critical (Major) An error in the software which causes an erroneous response in the operational system. An error in this classification may not be recognized as such by a trained observer due to the self-repair inherent in the system.

,	Total 6 Hours	2,884	1,556	976	5,386
	2	203	155	66	457
-	7	191	143	84	418
} 8		284	219	121	624
1980	2	184	171	76	431
	1	211	171	98	780
	5	184	187	157	528
1		182	146	161	489
	0 11	170	120	100	390
	9 10	155	100	50	305
	ω ,	140	78		138
	7	140	78		188
62	·	140	78		188
6261 -	<u>.</u>	140			140
	4 .	140			140
	ε .	140			140
	7	140			140
		140			140
	. 0				
	Calendar Yr. Month	FAA Technical Center Hrs/Mo.	Elwood Hrs/Mo.	Clementon Hrs/Mo.	Total Hrs/Mo.

Start Baseline	$_{\Lambda}$ $_{ abla}$ Testing	Notion't Momt	MID, RDAS A
∇	Msg, Routing	Perf. Monitor Intersite Comm CIDIN & Surv.	System Software
Channel Mgmt. Surveillance Data Extr.			

Figure 3. DABS Software Test Baseline

#### Non-Chargeable Errors:

- 3. Other (Minor) An error which has no measurable effect on the operational system or is of unknown cause at this time (hardware/software/cockpit). Errors of unknown causes would be charged against the DABS system rather than the software.
- 4. No Count A trouble report which was erroneously attributed to software errors. In addition, change proposals, enhancements, duplicate trouble reports and "cockpit errors" are included.

A summary of chargeable errors is presented in the matrix in Table 1. Only software modules identified in the table were included in the reliability analysis. Other software modules which are off-line analysis tools or are used during maintenance or pre-initialization were not modeled because they are not part of the mission software. The ATARS module which will eventually constitute a large portion of the DABS software subsystem cannot be analyzed now because it is being rewritten and is not scheduled for extensive testing until Spring of 1981. A computer listing of all DABS trouble reports is contained in Appendix C.

Table 1. Chargeable DABS Software Failures

	-	SYS	MTD RDAS	COMM	PM	MR <sub>&amp;</sub>	NM —	<u>см</u>	DEX	SURV	F —
1979	FEB							1		8	9
	MAR									0	0
	APR									1	1
	MAY	4		1	3	1		1		4	14
	JUN	1		1	0					2	4
	JUL	3		1	2	2			1	3	12
	AUG	2		1	0					1	4
	SEP	4		1	1	1		1		2	10
	OCT	1		0	5		3			2	11
	NOV	1		0	0		0		1	1	3
	DEC	0		0	1		6	1		2	10
1980	JAN	0		1	1		2	1		2	7
	FEB	1		3	0		4	2	<b>j</b>	2	12
	MAR	0		1	0	2	3	2		3	11
	APR	0	1	1	4	1	3	2		2	14
	MAY	ı	1		2		1	3		4	12
	JUN	0	1		1		0			2	4
~		18	3	11	20	7	22	14	2	41	138

#### 3. APPROACH TO SOFTWARE RELIABILITY MODELING.

#### 3.1 THEORETICAL SOFTWARE RELIABILITY MODEL.

The reliability growth model introduced by Duane in 1964 and more recently expounded by Codier, has found wide acceptance by reliability engineers. It is simple to use and it is applicable to both continuous and discrete data cases. Its wide applicability to diverse hardware test programs and more recently to software test data prompted its use here.

Using data from several different types of hardware test programs as a basis, Duane plotted cumulative failure rate  $(\lambda_{\Sigma})$  vs. total operating time (t) and observed a linear relationship between log  $(\lambda_{\Sigma})$  and log (T) for each equipment. This relationship is characterized by the model:

$$\lambda_{\Sigma} = KT^{-\alpha}$$
 where,

 $\lambda_{\Sigma}$  = cumulative failure rate

 $K = a \mod 2$  parameter to be estimated (represents  $\lambda$  at T=1)

T = total operating hours, cycles or missions

a = Growth rate to be estimated.

Duane presents a method for estimating the model parameter directly from the data plotted on log-log paper. The growth parameter—can be obtained by calculating the slope of the line. The location parameter is also obtained directly from the plot as the value for  $\lambda_{\Sigma}$  at T = 1. K can be interpreted as the initial or zero-age failure rate. For software, it is a function of program complexity, size, its maturity relative to the state-of-the-art and other variables.

The curve is more sensitive to the exponent  $\alpha$  than to K. The exponent reflects the intensity with which reliability improvement is pursued; it nearly always lies between .2 and .5, the average being close to .3.

In addition to information regarding cumulative failure rates, the predicted failure rate at any point in time; i.e., instantaneous failure rate  $\lambda_t$ , can also be estimated from the following equation where F = total failures and all other variables have been previously defined.

$$\lambda_{t} = \frac{\partial F}{\partial T} = \frac{\partial}{\partial T} (\lambda_{\Sigma} T) = \frac{\partial}{\partial T} (KT^{-\alpha} T)$$

$$= (1-\alpha)KT^{-\alpha} = (1-\alpha)\lambda_{\Sigma}$$

Thus, program progress can be modeled using cumulative information and can be continuously monitored using the current information.

#### 3.2 DATA ANALYSIS.

The operating time and error data base for each software module was analyzed to provide inputs into the Duane model. Using chargeable errors and test time the cumulative error rate  $\lambda_{\Sigma}$  = total failures/total time was calculated for each month in which at least l error was reported. The data were plotted in accordance with the Duane growth curve requirements and model parameters were estimated if growth were evident.

The modeling process generated a model of cumulative error rate,  $\lambda_{\Sigma} = KT^{-\alpha}$ , and a model of instantaneous error rate,  $\lambda_{t} = (1-\alpha)\lambda_{\Sigma}$ . The reciprocals of error rates are the MTBFs, cumulative and instantaneous respectively. In addition, MTBCF, i.e., mean time between critical (severity class 1) failures, values were calculated where applicable.

For the modules where reliability improvement was evident, the models were used as predictive tools to estimate the error rate during future testing. In this analysis the future consisted of the 1790 test hours during July, August and September of 1980. Results of the predictions were then compared to actual data. The analysis of the COM module (Section 4.1) serves as a detailed example of the process. For information purposes, Table 2 contains a listing of chargeable errors written during the prediction test interval.

Table 2. Chargeable Failures Reported During the Prediction Interval

Report Number	Date of Error	Module	Severity
M0002	7/10/80	CM	1
N0066	7/11/80	MTD	2
S0317	7/16/80	PM	2
S0319	7/16/80	PM	2
S0320	7/16/80	PM	1
S0321	7/18/80	SYS	1
S0326	7/20/80	COMM	2
S0328	7/23/80	SURV	2
S0330	7/24/80	CM	2
S0331	7/24/80	SYS	2
S0333	7/24/80	SURV	1
N0072	8/11/80	SURV	2
S0334	8/ 4/80	COMM	2
S0335	8/ 4/80	COMM	2
S0337	8/ 4/80	COMM	2
S0338	8/ 4/80	COMM	2
M0004	9/29/80	SURV	2
M0005	9/29/80	SURV	2
M0006	9/29/80	SURV	2
M0008	9/29/80	SURV	2
M0014	9/29/80	DEX	2
\$0358	9/15/80	SYS	2

#### 4. RELIABILITY EVALUATION OF DABS SOFTWARE MODULES.

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#### 4.1 RELIABILITY EVALUATION OF THE COMMUNICATION MODULE.

The Communications (COM) Module includes the surveillance and CIDIN communications programs which control and monitor transfer of data between a sensor and external facilities. The reliabilities of other software in the intersite communications package were not modeled because the software is associated with off-line and maintenance processing and is not part of the mission software.

The COM module was tested for 4966 hours during which 11 chargeable errors were reported (see Table 3). Only 4091 test hours along with the 11 errors were used to construct the growth model because the data base was terminated at the last reported failure in accordance with the rules of model construction. Results of the model generation and reliability predictions follow.

The model which describes cumulative error rate is  $\lambda_{\Sigma}$  = .174 T<sup>-.503</sup> where  $\lambda_{\Sigma}$  = cumulative error rate and T = cumulative test hours. example, at the time of the last reported error (T = 4091 hr.) the model predicts  $\lambda_{\Sigma}$  = .00265 error/hr. or 377 hr. MTBF. The measured error rate at T = 4091 hr. was .0027 error/hr. or 372 hr. MTBF. When used as a predictive tool to extrapolate beyond the time limits of the data base to T = 6756 hours,  $\lambda_{\Sigma}$  = .174 (6756)-.503 = .00206 error/ hr. or 485 hours MTBF. The time interval between 4091 hours and 6756 hours (2665 hours) includes the last 875 hours of test without a reported failure and 1790 hours of test during the prediction interval. Because the model predicted a cumulative error rate of .00206 error/hr. at  $T \approx 6756$  hr., the expected number of cumulative errors was calculated from:  $F = \lambda_{\Sigma}$ . T = .00206 error/hr.  $\cdot$  6756 hr. = 139 errors. Because 11 errors had already been reported within 4091 test hours, the remaining 2.9 errors represent a prediction to be compared with the observed results. In fact, five chargeable errors were reported against the COM module, a number which is well within the limits of statistical variation. Figure 4 contains a graph of the model.

The model which describes instantaneous error rate and MTBF is  $\lambda_t=.0865~\text{T}^{-.503}$ . It represents the rate at which errors are systematically being identified and removed from the COM module at time T hours. For example, at T = 6756 hours,  $\lambda_t=.0865~(6756)^{-.503}=.00102~\text{error/hr.}$  or 976 hr. MTBF. The value of  $\lambda_t$  at T = 6756 has the significance that if the test correction process were to cease at T = 6756 hours, the error rate of the COM module would no longer decrease, but would become constant at  $\lambda=.00102~\text{error/hr.}$  or 976 hr. MTBF.

Table 3. Communication Module - Reliability Data Summary

Мо	onth	Monthly Test Hrs (T)	Monthly Errors (F)	Cumulative Test Hrs. $(T_{\Sigma})$	Cumulative Errors $(F_{\Sigma})$	Cumulative Error/Hr $(\lambda_{\Sigma})$	Average Time Between Errors (MTBF <sub>E</sub> )
1979	Feb Mar						
	Apr May June	140 140	1	140	1 2	.0071	140
	July Aug Sept	188 188 188	1 1 1	468 656 844	3 4 5	.0064	156 164 169
197 <b>9</b>	Oct Nov Dec	305 390 489	0 0 0	1149 1539 2028			
1980	Jan Feb	528 480 431	1 3 1	2556 3036 3467	6 9	.0023	426 337 347
	Apr May June	624 418 457	1	4091 4509 4966	11	.0027	372
-	July Aug Sept	1790		6756			




Figure 4. Communication Module - Reliability Growth Model

#### 4.2 RELIABILITY EVALUATION OF THE PERFORMANCE MONITORING MODULE.

The Performance Monitoring (PM) module, a portion of intrasite communications, is responsible for gathering and analyzing status of the sensor and the transmission of status messages to external facilities.

As reported in Table 4, the PM software was tested for 4966 hours during which 20 chargeable errors were reported. Of the chargeable errors, five were classified as critical. Figure 5, which contains the reliability growth curve for the PM module shows that the module experienced a decreasing error rate throughout the test except for minor fluctuations. The cumulative error rate model,  $\lambda_{\Sigma} = .1403 T^{-.419}$ , gives  $\lambda_{\Sigma} = .00348$  error/hr. at T = 6756 hours. This translates into 3.5 expected errors during the time of the test interval used for prediction purposes. Because 3 chargeable errors were reported during the 1790 test hours of the prediction interval, there is close agreement and acceptance of the model.

The instantaneous error rate model,  $\lambda_{\rm t} = .0815 \, {\rm T}^{-.419}$ , predicts that  $\lambda = .00203 \, {\rm error/hr.}$  at T = 6756 which is equivalent to 494 hours MTBF.

## 4.3 RELIABILITY EVALUATION OF MESSAGE ROUTING AND DATA LINK PROCESSING MODULES.

The Message Routing (MR) software is responsible for routing incoming messages to the appropriate software module. Data Link (DL) processing manages uplink and downlink messages to/from participating DABS equipped aircraft. MR & DL software were tested together and form a single software module for the purpose of reliability analysis.

Table 5 contains the time and error data used to generate the reliability growth curve shown in Figure 6. Using the cumulative growth model,  $\lambda_{\Sigma}=.3467~\mathrm{T^{-0.645}}$ ,  $\lambda_{\Sigma}=.00117~\mathrm{error/hr.}$  at T = 6756 hours. The model predicts the occurrence of 7.9 errors throughout the test of 6756 hours. Because 7 errors were reported during the initial test phases, 0.9 errors were predicted to occur during the prediction test interval. Actually, no failures were reported during the 1790 hours of additional test, a value within acceptable statistical variation.

The instantaneous error rate model,  $\lambda_t = .123T^{-.645}$ , predicts  $\lambda_t = .000417$  error/hour or 2400 hours MTBF at T = 6756 hours.

Table 4. Performance Monitoring Module - Reliability Data Summary

Mi	onth	Monthly Test Hrs (T)	Monthly Errors (F)	Cumulative Test Hrs. $(T_{\Sigma})$	Cumulative Errors $(F_{\Sigma})$	Cumulative Error/Hr (\(\lambda_{\Sigma}\)	Average Time Between Errors (MTBF <sub>E</sub> )
1979	Feb Mar						_
	Apr May June	140	3	140 280	3	.0214	47
	July	188	2	468	5	.0107	93
	Aug	188	0	656			
	Sept	188	1	844	6	.0071	141
		_					
	0c <b>t</b>	305	5	1149	11	.0096	104
	Nov	390	0	1539			
1979	Dec	489	1	2028	12	.0059	169
-			[ -		-		
1980	Jan	528	1	2556	13	.0051	196
	Feb	480	l	3036			
	Mar	431	ļ	3467			
	-						
	Apr	624	4	4091	17	.0042	2 38
	May	418	2	4509	19	.0042	2 38
	June	457	1	4966	20	.0040	250
.=	July				·		<del> </del>
	Aug	1790	}				}
	Sept			6756			
	OCPE						




Figure 5. Performance Monitor Module - Reliability Growth Model

Table 5. Message Routing and Data Link Modules - Reliability Data Summary

Mo	onth	Monthly Test Hrs (T)	Monthly Errors (F)	Cumulative Test Hrs. (T <sub>E</sub> )	Cumulative Errors $(F_{\Sigma})$	Cumulative Error/Hr (\(\lambda_{\Sigma}\)	Average Time Between Errors (MTBF <sub>E</sub> )
1979					-		· · · -
	Mar						
	Apr			· · · · · · · ·			
	May	140	1	140	1	.0071	141
	June	140		280			
= =							
	July	188	2	468	3	.0064	156
	Aug	188		656			
	Sept	188	1	844	4	.0047	213
	÷						
	0ct	305		1149			
	Nov	390		1539			
1979	Dec	489		2028			
1980		528		2556	. =		-
-,	Feb	480		3036			
	Mar	431	2	3467	6	.0017	588
	Apr	624	1	4091	7	.0017	588
	May	418		4509			
	June	457		4966			
-				· ·	=		-
	July	1790					
	Aug Sept	1790		6756			
	sehr						
		I	I		•		




Figure 6. Message Fouting and Data Link Modules - Reliability Growth Model

#### 4.4 RELIABILITY EVALUATION OF DATA EXTRACTION MODULE.

Included in this evaluation are data from the portion of the Data Extraction (DEX) module which is associated with data collection; i.e., on-line real time extraction of performance data from the DABS data base and its recording on magnetic tape. Playback, quick-look and extended analysis software are used off-line and are not part of the mission software.

As seen in Table 6 and Figure 7, the DEX module is very reliable. Only two chargeable errors were reported in 5386 test hours for an MTBF of 2693 hours or an error rate of .000371 error/hr. One of the errors was classified as critical. Too few data are available to generate a reliability trend curve. It can be seen however, that the error rate is decreasing which implies that the instantaneous MTBF is greater than 2693 hours. There was one error reported against DEX software during the prediction test interval.

#### 4.5 RELIABILITY EVALUATION OF CHANNEL MANAGEMENT MODULE.

Channel Management (CM) regulates all activity on the RF channel, scheduling the aircraft interrogations and corresponding listening periods to ensure that communications and surveillance tasks are accomplished for each aircraft.

The CM module has been characterized by T. I. software designers as the most complex of the DABS software modules primarily because of its logical structure. Its measured reliability is among the lowest. During 5386 hours of test, 14 chargeable errors were reported for an error rate of .0026 error/hr. or 385 hours MTBF. Table 7 contains cumulative time and error data for CM. The data plot in Figure 8 shows that no trend analysis is possible because of the abrupt changes in slope of the curve. In fact, during the test period between 2500 hr. and 5000 hr. CM error rate increased from .0016 error/hr. to .0028 error/hr. Subsequent testing indicates a reversal of the trend because the error rate appears to be decreasing in the prediction interval between 4929 hours and 7176 hours. Consequently, for prediction purposes the cumulative error rate  $\lambda_Z$  = total errors/total hours = .0026 error/hr. will be used.

#### 4.6 RELIABILITY EVALUATION OF NETWORK MANAGEMENT MODULE.

Network Management (NM) is a portion of intrasite communications responsible for communication of surveillance data to and from other sensors.

Table 8 contains the data used in the reliability analysis of the NM software. Based on a total of 4122 test hours and 22 chargeable errors

Table 6. Data Extraction Module - Reliability Data Summary

Мо	on <b>th</b>	Monthly Test Hrs (T)	Monthly Errors (F)	Cumulative Test Hrs. $(T_{\Sigma})$	Cumulative Errors $(F_{\Sigma})$	Cumulative Error/Hr (\(\lambda_{\Sigma}\)	Average Time Between Errors (MTBF <sub>E</sub> )
1979	Feb	140		140			
	Mar	140		280			
	Apr	140		420			-
	May	140		560			
	June	140		700			
	July	188	1	888	1	.0011	909
	Aug	188		1076			
	Sept	188		1264			
	0ct	305		1569	<u>-</u>		-
	Nov	390	1	1959	2	.0010	1008
1979		489		2448			1
1980	 Jan	528		2976			
	Feb	480		3456	<u>.</u>		
	Mar	431		3887			
	Apr	624		4511			-
	May	418	{	4929	1		
	June	457		5386			
	Ju <b>ly</b>						
	Aug	1790					
	Sept			7176			
				1	ļ	1	1




Figure 7. Data Extraction Module - Data Plot

Table 7. Channel Management Module - Reliability Data Summary

Month	Monthly Test Hrs (T)		Cumulative Test Hrs. $(T_{\widehat{\Sigma}})$	Cumulative Errors $(F_{\Sigma})$	Cumulative Error/Hr $(\lambda_{\Sigma})$	Average Time Between Errors (MTBF <sub>E</sub> )
1979 Feb	i	1	140	1	.00714	140
Mar	140		280			
Арт	. 140		420			-
May	1	1	560	2	.0036	2 78
Jur	1		700			
 Jul	y 188		888	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·		-
Aug	- 1		1076			
Ser		1	1264	3	.0024	417
– 0ct	305		1569			-
Nov		j	1959			
1979 Dec		1	2448	4	.0016	625
1980 Jar	528	1	2976	5	.0017	588
Feb	480	2	3456	7	.002	500
Мат	431	2	3887	9	.0023	4 35
Apı	624	2	4511	11	.0024	417
May	, 418	3	4929	14	.0028	357
Jui	ne 457		5386			
Ju Au Se	g 1790		7176			




Figure 8. Channel Management Module - Data Plot

Table 8. Network Management - Reliability Data Summary

Мо	onth	Monthly Test Hrs (T)	Monthly Errors (F)	Cumulative Test Hrs. $(T_{\Sigma})$	Cumulative Errors $(F_{\Sigma})$	Cumulative Error/Hr $(\lambda_{\Sigma})$	Average Time Between Errors (MTBF <sub>E</sub> )
1979	Feb						
	Mar						
	Apr						
	May						}
	June						
	July						
	Aug					1	
	Sept						
	0ct	305	3	305	3	.0098	102
	Nov	390	0	695			
1979	Dec	489	6	1184	9	.018	56
1980	Jan	528	2	1712	11	.0064	156
	Feb	480	4	2192	15	.0068	147
	Mar	431	3	2623	18	.0069	145
	Apr	624	3	3247	21	.0065	154
	May	418	1	3665	22	.0060	167
	June	457	0	4122			
	July		ļ ———				
	Aug	1790		5912			}
	Sept						

NM cumulative error rate was measured to be  $\lambda_\Sigma=22/4122=.00534$  error/hr. or 187 hours MTBF. NM software has been characterized as moderately complex; it has the highest predicted error rate of the DABS software modules which were studied. Although its error rate appears to be decreasing (see Figure 9), there are not sufficient current data to support trend analysis. Data reported during the prediction test interval also indicate a decreasing error rate trend. During 1790 hours of test there were no reported errors. However, a large portion of the apparent reliability improvement may be due to a lessening of the severity of the test environment. The formal NM test which was run to demonstrate compliance with operational requirements had been completed in June 1980. Consequently the NM software may have been operating in reduced data and requirements environments during the July to September time frame.

## 4.7 RELIABILITY EVALUATION OF MTD AND RDAS MODULES.

The Moving Target Detector (MTD) and Radar Data Acquisition Subsystem (RDAS) programs are integral to the sensor track software which is required to acquire and track DABS and ATCRBS aircraft.

As noted in Table 9, the MTD and RDAS module was tested for only 3 months resulting in 1499 test hours and 3 chargeable errors for an error rate of .002 error/hr. or 500 hours MTBF. The data in Figure 10 show a constant error rate, with a slight increasing trend which is influenced by the paucity of data. During the prediction test interval no errors were reported against the MTD and RDAS module.

## 4.8 RELIABILITY EVALUATION OF SYSTEM SOFTWARE MODULE.

System (SYS) software refers to all the software required to calibrate and initialize DABS and recover from hardware failures. SYS also contains standardized software support utilities.

As noted in Table 10, SYS was tested for 4966 hours with 18 reported chargeable errors. Fourteen (14) of the errors occurred within the first 844 hours of test which resulted in a high error rate during early testing followed by a rapidly decreasing error rate. This is shown graphically in Figure 11. Because SYS code resides in every computer and much of it is replicated, the code is tested more thoroughly. More of the logical paths are exercised with a higher probability of encountering a logical "bug." This may account for the extremely high growth rate of .863.

The cumulative error rate model,  $\lambda_{\Sigma} = 5.689 \text{T}^{-.863}$ , predicts that  $\lambda_{\Sigma} = .00281 \text{ error/hr.}$  at T = 6756 hours. This is equivalent to a




Figure 9. Network Management - Data Plot

Table 9. MTD and RDAS Modules - Reliability Data Summary

Marie Marie Marie Commendation of the Commenda

Month  1979 Feb  Mar  Apr  May  June		Monthly Test Hrs (T)	Monthly Errors (F)	Cumulative Test Hrs. $(T_{\Sigma})$	Cumulative Errors $(F_{\Sigma})$	Cumulative Error/Hr (\(\lambda_{\Sigma}\)	Average Time Between Errors (MTBF <sub>E</sub> )
	May						
	July Aug Sept						
197 <b>9</b>	Oct Nov Dec						
1980	Jan Feb Mar						
	Apr May June	624 418 457	1 1 1	624 1042 1499	1 2 3	.0016	625 526 500
	July Aug Sept	1790					




Figure 10. MTD & RDAS Modules - Data Plot

Table 10. System Software Module - Reliability Data Summary

Мс	onth	Monthly Test Hrs (T)	Monthly Errors (F)	Cumulative Test Hrs. $(T_{\Sigma})$	Cumulative Errors $(F_{\Sigma})$	Cumulative Error/Hr (\(\lambda_{\Sigma}\)	Average Time Between Errors (MTBF <sub>E</sub> )
1979	Feb Mar						
	Apr						
	May	140	4	140	4	.029	34
	June	140	1	280	5	.018	56
	July	188	3	468	8	.017	59
	Aug	188	2	656	10	.015	67
	Sept	188	4	844	14	.017	59
	Oct	305	1	1149	15	.013	77
	Nov	390	1	1539	16	.010	100
1979	Dec	489	0	2028			
1980	Jan	528	0	2556		<del> </del>	-
	Feb	480	1	3036	17	.0056	179
	Mar	431	0	3467			
	Apr	624	0	4091			
	May	418	1	4509	18	.004	250
	June	457	0	4966			
	Ju <b>1y</b>						-
	Aug	1790					
	Sept		}	6756			1
	-						1




Figure 11. System Software Module - Reliability Growth Model

prediction that one error will occur during the prediction test interval. Three chargeable errors were reported, a number which is quite high. The occurrence of three or more errors when only one is expected should occur no more than 8 percent of the time. Therefore, the prediction is marginally acceptable.

The instantaneous error rate of .000386 error/hr. at T = 6756 hours was predicted using the model  $\lambda$  = .78T<sup>-.863</sup>. Based on the above comparison between predicted and actual numbers of failures, the instantaneous failure rate is expected to be somewhat optimistic.

## 4.9 RELIABILITY EVALUATION OF THE SURVEILLANCE PROCESSING MODULE.

The Surveillance (SURV) processing module is responsible for tracking targets, correlating radar reports with beacon reports or tracks and for maintaining the surveillance file.

The SURV module accrued 5386 hours of test during which 41 chargeable errors were reported. Its cumulative error rate at T = 5386 was .0076 error/hr. or 131 hours MTBF. The data used in the reliability analysis is contained in Table 11. Figure 12 displays the reliability growth model. It should be noted that the SURV module exhibited decreasing error rates, but at different rates. The change in slope of the curve may be attributed to variations in the test environment, to delays in documenting the errors or to delays in implementing corrective action. All three situations have been identified as causative factors which perturb reliability growth models. Note that the growth curve was generated using weighted least squares which stresses current data. The slope of the line favors the current trend rather than the overall trend.

Based on the cumulative growth model,  $\lambda_{\Sigma} = .1067 \mathrm{T}^{-.3071}$ , the predicted  $\lambda_{\Sigma}$  at T = 7176 hours is .006983 error/hr. which is equivalent to a total of 50.1 expected errors. This implies a prediction of 9.1 errors during the 1790-hour prediction test interval. Seven (7) errors were reported against the SURV module, a number which compares favorably with the prediction.

The instantaneous growth model,  $\lambda_t = .0739T^{-.3071}$ , predicts an error rate of .00484 error/hr. or 207 hours MTBF at T = 7176 test hours.

Table 11. Surveillance Module - Reliability Data Summary

Мо	onth	Monthly Test Hrs (T)	Monthly Errors (F)	Cumulative Test Hrs. $(T_{\Sigma})$	Cumulative Errors $(F_{\Sigma})$	Cumulative Error/Hr (\lambda_{\Sigma})	Average Time Between Errors (MTBF <sub>E</sub> )
1979	Feb	140	8	140	8	.0571	18
	Mar	140	0	280	8		
	Apr	140	1	420	9	.0214	47
	May	140	4	560	13	.0232	43
	June	140	2	700	15	.0214	47
	July	188	3	888	18	.0203	49
	-	188	1	1076	19	.018	56
	Aug	188	2	1264	21	.017	59
	Sept	100	} ~~	1204	21	.017	)
	Oct	305	2	1569	23	.015	67
	Nov	390	1	1959	24	.013	77
1979	Dec	489	2	2448	26	.011	91
		528	2	2976	 28	.009	111
1980		480	2	3456	30	.0086	116
	Feb	[	3	3887	33	.0085	118
	Mar	431	3	3007	ور	.0009	110
	Apr	624	2	4511	35	.0078	128
	May	418	4	4929	39	.0079	127
	June	457	2	5386	41	.0076	1 32
	July Aug Sept	1790		7176			





Figure 12. Surveillance Module - Reliability Growth Model

## 5. INTEGRATED DABS HARDWARE AND SOFTWARE RELIABILITY MODEL.

#### 5.1 SOFTWARE SUBSYSTEM RELIABILITY MODEL.

The reliability block diagram of the DABS software is



The reliability model which corresponds to the above block diagram is

$$R_{S.W.} = \frac{9}{11} R_{i}$$
 $i=1$ 

whe re

 $R_{S.W.}$  = Reliability of the software subsystem  $R_{i}$  = Reliability of each module, i=1, 9

It was noted in Section 4 of this report that the reliability growth model used to measure DABS software reverts to a constant failure rate model at the conclusion of the test/analyze/fix process underway during a test program. Therefore, the reliability model for operational software is identical to the reliability model used by the FAA to model hardware reliability. It is characterized by an exponential distribution of times between errors or it may be stated as a Poisson distribution of the number of errors within a specified time interval.

Using terminology similar to that used by the FAA in the hardware reliability model,

$$\lambda_{S.W.} = \sum_{i=1}^{N} \lambda_i$$

where  $\lambda_{S.W.}$  = error rate of the total software program  $\lambda_i$  = error rate of a software module for i=1, 9.

As noted earlier, the error rates of the modules are changing because of the results of debugging the software. Therefore, the reliability prediction will be made in terms of accumulated software test time. A summary of reliability predictions for the DABS software modules is presented in Table 12. In summary, it states that a chargeable error will occur within the DABS software every 53 test hours. For comparison purposes, Table 13 contains a summary of module critical error rates.

It was noted earlier that the error rate of a module may improve dramatically once the module is removed from a test environment. An improvement factor of 5 was noted by the author in a similar study. It is not implied that the same factor is applicable to DABS software, but if it were, the time between chargeable errors would increase to only 265 hours.

The software reliability model makes no provision for software repair in the event of failure. The DABS system is structured to provide reconfiguration in the event of certain hardware failures. Critical software failures will generally fail the system. Also, redundancy features of hardware do not apply to software. If two redundant processors encounter the same logical software error, and if the error is critical, both processors and therefore the computer will fail.

# 5.2 DABS INTEGRATED SYSTEM (HARDWARE AND SOFTWARE) RELIABILITY MODEL.

The reliability block diagram which combines hardware with software elements of DABS is

The reliability model is  $R_{H.W.} \times R_{S.W.} = R_{DABS}$ .

Translated into the effective failure rate ( $\lambda_{\rm EFF}$ ) model used by FAA,  $\lambda_{\rm DABS} = \lambda_{\rm EFF}$  (Hardware) +  $\lambda$  (Software). Based on data contained in Report No. FAA-RD-80-36, "Discrete Address Beacon System (DBAS) Baseline Test and Evaluation", by M. Holtz,  $\lambda_{\rm EFF} = .001736$  failure/hr.

Table 12. Summary of Software Reliability Predictions

	Reliabili	ty Prediction	ns
Software Module	Number of Errors Within Prediction Interval	Number of Errors/ Test Hour	Average Time Between Errors
Communications	2.9	.001020	976
Performance Monitor	3.5	.002030	494
Message Routing & Data Link	0.9	.000417	2400
System Software	1	.000386	2588
Surveillance Processing	9.1	.004840	207
Data Extraction	No Prediction	.00037	2703
Channel Management	No Prediction	.00260	385
Network Management	No Prediction	.00534	187
MTD & RDAS	No Prediction	.00200	500
TOTAL		.019	53

Table 13. Summary of Module Critical Error Rates

Software Module	Test Hours	Number of Critical Errors	Critical Error Rate - Critical Error/Hr.
COM	4966	5	.001
PM	4966	5	.001
MR & DL	4966	0	
DEX	5386	1	.00019
CM	5386	4	.00074
NM	4122	2	.000485
MTD & RDAS	1499	1	.000667
SYS	4966	7	.0014
SURV	5386	6	.00111
			.00662

Note: During July, August and September of 1980, 4 critical errors were reported during 1790 hours of test. The error rate of .00223 error/hr is equivalent to MTBCF of 448 hours.

Using all chargeable software errors,  $\lambda_{\rm DABS}$  = .001736 + .019 = .020736 failure/hr. or 48 hours MTBF. Using only critical software errors,  $\lambda_{\rm DABS}$  = .001736 + .00223 = .003966 fail/hr. or 252 hours MTBF.

#### APPENDIX A

Review and Critique of the Available Hardware Reliability Model and the Hardware Reliability Prediction for the DABS

FAA Report No. FAA-NA-78-31, "Plan for the Reliability and Maintainability Evaluation of the Discrete Address Beacon (DABS) Engineering Laboratory Models," contains the hardware reliability model and reliability prediction for the DABS. The report also addresses the failure reporting, data collection, data processing system and the criteria which will be used to evaluate (measure) hardware reliability of engineering laboratory models.

The critique presented herein addresses only those portions of the report which deal with the DABS hardware reliability models and the reliability prediction. Review and critique of the failure data collection, processing and analysis procedures are outside the scope of this task.

The FAA report describes the construction and use of a series of Einhorn equations (models) which transform mean-time-between-failure (MTBF) and mean-time-to-repair (MTTR) of an equipment into effective failure rate ( $\lambda_{\rm EFF}$ ) for the equipment. In addition, a method is provided by which effective failure rates of 2 or more equipments may be combined to produce a subsystem effective failure rate. The models of the DABS subsystems are well prepared and documented. The comments which follow address minor points of the modeling process and several major topics which were not addressed in the report, but which might be candidates for inclusion in a revision to the document.

## GENERAL COMMENTS:

- 1. The predicted mean-time-between-failures (MTBF) of a single channel sensor is 774 hours, a value considerably lower than the 1,000 hours specified in the engineering requirement. There is nothing in the document to indicate that appropriate improvements such as redesign or use of high reliability parts will be employed to improve system reliability. As stated in Report No. FAA-RD-80-36, DABS measured MTBF is 575 hours but is increasing. The FAA should monitor test results closely, continue to measure system MTBF during development testing and implement effective corrective actions to improve system MTBF to meet the specification.
- 2. The state diagram technique used to model DABS hardware reliability appears to generate  $\lambda_{EFF}$  which is pessimistic. Significant terms in the calculation of  $\lambda_{EFF}$  are obtained by multiplying the failure rate of a specific hardware configuration by the probability of failure in the configuration for the entire anticipated mission. However, the

most likely time of failure for equipments having MTBF >> mission time is near the midpoint of the mission. Hence, the calculated probabilities of failure are nearly doubled.

- 3. The report should contain a brief but complete description of the DABS mission. A complete reliability evaluation plan should describe the anticipated mission or a standardized mission which will be used for reliability measurement. Mission identification should identify and describe all mission phases, their duration and anticipated environments. The results of the mission analysis should then be merged with the results of a systems analysis which then identifies the full complement of equipment, including reliability block diagrams, which will be used to measure reliability during each mission phase. Also included are alternate modes of operation and success/failure criteria.
- 4. The reliability equations are very general and optimistic because they include the probability of repairing equipments without considering the number of repairmen, number of spares or administrative delays which may prolong maintenance time. The FAA equations are applicable only if an infinite number of spares and repairmen are instantly available at each operational site. If reasonable constraints were placed on the above model parameters, predicted reliability would decrease.
- 5. The FAA report specifically states that "special reliability tests" will not be conducted and that objectives of the reliability and maintainability (R&M) evaluation can be achieved using FAA performance tests. It should be recognized that not all performance tests will be applicable to the measurement of DABS R&M. The report should contain the results of an analysis of the anticipated test program which would describe the quantity and quality of the anticipated data and why the data can be used for R&M measurement.
- 6. The "estimation" of equipment MTBF should include the calculation of confidence intervals for equipment and system MTBF; i.e., an interval which contains the true but unknown MTBF with stated probability.


#### SPECIFIC COMMENTS:

#### 1. Page 28 Second Paragraph

Per this paragraph. A statistical test will be performed to determine if the exponential distribution is appropriate to describe time to failure and time to repair data. The report should describe alternative statistical techniques for data analysis if the exponential distribution fails to adequately describe these time data. This is especially important for time to repair which is often modeled using the log-normal distribution.

## 2. Pages 39/40

The reliability block diagram for two redundant equipments with a switch is



The reliability model for the above system is

$$R = e^{-\lambda t} + R_{SWITCH} (\lambda t) e^{-\lambda t}$$

where

 $\lambda$  = failure rate of 176 K memory string

t = mission duration

 $R_{SWITCH}$  = reliability of switching element

# 3. Titles of Figures 1, 2, 4 and 12

These figures are titled "reliability models" but a more appropriate title is "reliability block diagram." The reliability model is usually defined as the equation which transforms MTBF into probability of success.

#### APPENDIX B

## A Recommended Software Reliability Failure Reporting System for DABS

The FAA currently uses the DABS Trouble Report/Change Proposal (Figure B-1) to document software errors. Additional analysis and follow-up are documented on DABS Trouble Report/Change Proposal Update Worksheet (Figure B-2). While the reporting system was not structured specifically to provide data suited for reliability analysis, the forms do provide most of the required information when completed in accordance with the Trouble Report Users Guide.

The difficulties encountered when using DABS Trouble Reports (TR) were primarily lack of completeness and lack of error classification. These weaknesses in the present system can be corrected by instituting an editorial review of the software errors as TRs are initiated, completed and classified. A glaring weakness in the procedure can be corrected by ensuring that the TRs contain the date of occurrence of the error as well as the date of TR initiation. It is recommended that a representative of the reliability engineering group participate in the editorial review because much of the data are needed for reliability analysis purposes.

As soon as error follow-up identifies causes for the initiation of a TR it should be classified with regard to CATEGORY and SEVERITY. With regards to CATEGORY, the following definitions are recommended for use by FAA.

Error Source Code	Error Source	Description
0	Requirements	Source of problem is changing, ill conceived or poorly stated performance requirement.
1	Design	Source of problem is in prelim-inary or detailed design.
2.	Coding	Source of problem is an error in implementing the design or code.
3.	Maintenance	Source of problem is an error introduced in process of trying to fix a previous error.
4.	Not Known	Source of error not known.

	FOR ORIGINATOR USE	
DRIGINATOR	ORIGINATING INSTALLATION	DATE HO DA YE
OFTWARE	and the same and the same and the same	CHANGE
RODUCT	VÉRSION	PROPOSAL [ ]
DENTIFIER		THOUBLE
HIGHTY	REVISION	HEPORT [ ]
] CRITICAL [] VERY	[]IMPORTANT []CAUSE	S []INTERESTING
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Figure B-1. DABS Trouble Report/Change Proposal

# DABS TROUBLE REPORT/CHANGE PROPOSAL UPDATE WORKSHEET

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SOLUTION COMMENTARY						
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INSTALLATIONS AFFECTE	۵			_		
OTHER FORMS INITIATED	-			-		-
ECN	DCN					
-	_					
_	~					
-	~					
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[] H# FIX TESTED AND	READY FOR IMPLE	PENTATION IECN	ATTACHED)			
TROUBLE CATEGORY	-				•	
[] H-HARDWARE PROBL	EM					
[] D-DOCUMENTATION [] E-DFSIGN PROBLEM						
[] R-NEW REQUIREMEN						
NA FORM 6365-247-79)		-				

Figure B-2. DABS Trouble Report/Change Proposal Update Worksheet

Errors should also be classified as to type:

Error Type Code	Type of Software Errors
A	Computational
В	Logic Errors
С	Data Input Errors
D	Data Handling Errors
E	Data Output Errors
F	Interface Errors
G	Data Definition Errors
Н	Data Base Errors
I	Operational Errors
J	Other
K	Documentation Errors
X	Trouble Report Rejection

Trouble reports should be classified as with regard to SEVERITY in accord with the following definitions:

### Chargeable Errors:

- l. Critical An error in the software which causes a significant or total loss of operational system capability.
- 2. Non-Critical (Major) An error in the software which causes an erroneous response in the operational system. An error in this classification may not be recognized as such by a trained observer due to the self repair inherent in the system.

## Non-Chargeable Errors:

- 3. Other (Minor) An error which has no measurable effect on the operational system or are of unknown cause at this time (hardware/software/cockpit). Errors of unknown cause would be charged against the DABS system rather than the software.
- 4. No Count A trouble report which was erroneously attributed to software errors. In addition, change proposals, enhancements, duplicate trouble reports and "cockpit errors" are included.

APPENDIX C
LISTING OF DABS SOFTWARE TROUBLE REPORTS

\*\*\* TR FRIGES JUG PRODUCAM CHIPS VIR 1 01 69 14 44 07/67/HO PAGE 2\*\*\*

:	CO.	FIWARE TROUBLE REPORTS - I	DABOO?	•	CHEET	1	;
::- :TR#	CHG PROP # INIT	DESCRIPTION	FRUD	PART	NO 	Онт. <b>1</b>	51:
70001	FAA	SET CAP BITS IN APIES	EABGO4	EXT	##1	171 - 70	3 1
70002		MISC EXIDED ANALY PRBLMS	DABO04	EXT	##5	17.1 79	7 1
200 <b>04</b>		CAN'T HNDL 48 AZCZECAM	DAE004	SURV	##G	1721:79	7 1
70003	ΓΛA			DEX	##5		
70006		UNIQUE CODE FLAG	DAB004	SURV		276: 75	
10007		HISTORY FIRMULES =3	DABUO4	CURV		2761 79	
7000 <b>8</b> 700 <b>09</b>		VEL REAGONABLE CODING ERR	DABOO4	SURV		270- 79	
70010		BAD DARS ID ON MING DISPLA 48 AZC BEAM COULD NOT HAN		CURV		711.75	
70010		ALT FLAG IN SURV FE NOT U		CM		1711 79 27 <b>1-</b> 79	
70012		C BITS ALT GRAY CODE CHECK		SURV		2/1• 79 2/1: 79	
70013		VEL REAGONABLEMESS PROBLE		SURV		2/1. /7 2/1. /9	
25014		ASSOC ZONE BOUNDARIES CAL		SURV		2/1: 79	-
20015		ALT MISS COUNT NOT UPDATE		SURV		2/21.79	
70016		ONLY 3 CORFELATIONS ALLOW		SURV		2/2: /3	
20017		FILTER BY ID	DABO05	EXT		2/2:/79	
71251	FAA	ANAL DISAGREE WITH DISPLAY	Y DAE004	EXT		3/CL 79	
71252	EAA	ARIES AZIMOTH UNIT HEDWARD	E 0AB004	CM	C)	3/C: 79	7 OC
11256	FAA	INCURR DARS REPLY CLASS	DAB004	EXT	O##	4/0:/79	7 1
71257	FAA	SURV FILE EXTRACT LOSSES	D4B004	DEX	##0	4/12 79	7 1
71758		FALSE TRACK STARTS	DAP004	SURV	C.	4/1: 79	7 00
		RADAR PANGE MASK FOR NAFF	0.008AG 0	SA	##0	5/1- 79	7 11
		MAREC REFLECTOR FILE	DAB006	SA	##3	5/1- 79	7 11
		NAFEC DEEN ARRAY CAL CURVI		SA		5/1- 75	
2-697		60 NM FADAR RANGE MEN NAFT		SA	_	5/1- 79	
7.901		NAFEC SITE ADAFTATION	DABOO6	SA		5/1- 79	
		NAFEC SITE ADAFTATION	DAPOO6	SA		5/1- 79	
		NAFEC SITE ADAPTATION	DAPOOS	SA		5/14 79	
71759		BAD LINK FOR COLD START - 2 TPS FOR 1 A/C	DAB006	SYS		5/11 /9	
71260		ATCRBS MISSING REPLIES ON	0008AG	SURV		5/1c, 79	
	DS S-0007 0007 00			SURV		5/1c. /9	
23817		TILINE T D ON CP4 ALL TU		5Y <b>5</b>		5/1: 79 5/1 <sup>-7</sup> /79	
		PAD LINK FOR SAGMBX	DAE005	SYS SYS	-		7 1 7 11
		NAFEC COVERAGE MAP	DAP006	SA			7 11
		WHARLE TO ROLL CALL BADS	FAB006	SA		5/18 79	
		NEW NAMEC MUNUFULSE TABLE	DAPO06	SA			7 11
		EL HUDD PACK BACK MOND TB		54		5/18 79	
00		MARKE CONFRAGE MAR UPDATE	00034G	5A		5/1E 79	
13676		PACKIFACK ELWUOD ARIES S		SA	##0		
13878		IPC STATUS BIT OR'D INTO		PM	##0		-
7.3996	FWF	ELWOOD F A T MONO TABLE	DABOO6	SA		5/21 79	_
13903	SNS	ELWOOD FAT SITE ADAPTATIO	N DABOO6	SA		5/21 79	
20905		FLWOOD FAT SITE ADAPTATIO	N DABOO6	SA	##0	5/21 79	9 1
		DEACH/BACK ELWOOD LIVE S A	<b>BABOO6</b>	SA		5/2- 79	7 11
	DS-S-0014-0010 DD		DAB005	CM	##0	5/2- 79	7 11
		RED MASSAGE TILINE TIMEOU		PM	##0	5/24 79	7 11
		ASSICOR LOSING NON-DISCRE		SURV	##0	5/24 79	7 11
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13602 135 <b>33</b>		INCREASE LIMITS ON RELAY INIONSISTENT SA RELAY TAB		MR SA		5/E4 79 5/E4 79	

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TRM	CHG	PROP	# 1 <i>i</i>	NIT	DESCRIPT	ION	PRUD	FART	ND	OF E.	 J	ST:
73884			بل	NS 1401 TI	RACKING D	ADS	DABOOS	SA	##0	5/24	79	1
23885	DS - S	-001B	- 0006	O2PROCHA	im OVERLA	YING DATA	DABOOL	SURV	##0	5/:-	79	11
73886						CPME PARAMIRE	DAROO6	SA	##0	5/24	79	1
	DS-S	0019			AICH TO		DABOO6	COMM	##0	5/2.	19	11
71375						IAL CAME 'S	DVB009	SA		5/2:	77	1
	DE -2	-0002				OF LATE REP	DVB009	SURV		5/2:		
75087						SPARE OF FAIL		SYS		5/2:		o.c
70889	DO 0					HANGS WHSTART	DABOO6	SY5		5/24		1
					PATH FI)		DABOO6	MR		5/2:		
	רייות ב	-00.21			DMM A/B L		DARGO6	DRV	##0	-	79	
7 - 6 9 <b>8</b>	r. c.	00.0			DUT SON I		DADOO6	PM		5/2.		1
					IDIN DRIV CP FAILU		DAR006	DRV		5/0		11
			-			CHECKIN TBL	DABOO6	SYS	_	5/3.		
73910		0049					DABOO6	SYS		5/5.		1 1
73410 72911						CPME LOC. LINK SWITCH	DAB005 DAB006	SA		6/C.		1
	ne. e	-0024				INNA OFFICE		,SA		516.		. 1
						FOR ELMOOD, CLE	DAB006	SA SA		6/C.		11
				COPART		FOR IPC PARMS	DABOOS	SA SA		6/C.		11
						ER CURRECTON	D48006	DRV	-			
20010 2082 <b>4</b>	03 3					MNTS PRE INIT		SYS		6/Ct 6/Ct		11
	De e	-0023				DEG. TURN RATE		EXT		6/11		1
7382 <b>7</b>	22 3	00.,5	_			INTERRUPTS	EABOO6	SYS		6/18		oc.
	05-5	0024			ERSION OF		DABOOS	COMM		5/15		
73859		000				E PROCESSING	DABOO6	SURV	-	6/1:		√ĈS
23915						TARGETS	DABOO6	SURV		6/2:		1
73922						DAR RANGE MSK	DABOO6	SA		6/2:		Ġ.
71262						OF SILFNCE	DAB006	NM		5/2:		5 05
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23763					ORMAT IN		DABOOA	EXT		6/5:		60
13941	DS-S	-0027	_			NE SITE ADAPT	DABO05	SA		7/0:		11
						NE SITE ALAPT	D48006	5A		7/05		11
						NE SITE ADAPT.	DAROOS	9A		7/0:		11
						NE SITE ADAPT	DABOO6	SA		7/0:		
						SSEMINATION	DABOO6	SURV		7/0:		3
23945			5	NS PHY	COMP ID	USED FOR INT.	E48006	SYS		7/0:		ōc
73946			S	NS SYSTE	M FELGAD	RE CIDIN FRUT	DAPOOL	COMM	Ċ	7/0:	790	3 05
11263	DE-S	-0006	- 0026	00RADAR	ONLY CO	LIMATION	D40006	SURV		7/0:		
71765	DS S	5037	-0527	001 & P	FAILURE	PECOVERY	DAEOGA	5 <b>75</b>	Ċ	7/0:	798	- 55
23764			В	R RE-RE	LEASE ASS	SOCICURE CODE	245006	SURV		7/0:		1
Z1266			F	AA DAPS	MESS APT	S IN ERROR	DABO06	SURV		7/13	79	1
71258	1		F	AA UNSAT	IS ATCRB	S CPME	DABOO6	SURV		7/11	79	1
13959	•		J	AS CONVE	RT TO DA	80 <b>06. 4</b>	DABCO6					1
23961			J	AS DELET	ION OF O	LD FILES	DABOO5		##C	7/1-	79	ī
70958	DS-S	-0038	3-0028	COOVERF	LOW CNTR	NOT INCREMENT	DABOO6	DL		7/17		11
Z2960	DS-5	-0039	-0029	DOWRG F	LK SETTI	NG FOR FLK 2	DAB006	PM	C	7/1-	791	5 55
13964	DS-S	0040	-0030	OOCTR-D	EF RES L	ISTS WRONG	DABOOL	ATAR	* C	7/1	791	110
23965	DS-5	-0041	-0031	OOFERF	MONITOR !	FFOBES	PA5006		·- 0	7/15	75	5N
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11273	DS-S	-00:50	- 0036	OOFAI	LURE	EZREC	OVER	Y - I	PMS	DABOO	5 5	YS		07/2		7	
71274	DS-S	0051	-0037	OOFAI	LURE	EZREC	OVER	Y - F	ERF MON	DARGO	5 5	YS		07/2		ý	3
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23837								N CAS	200X	DAROO	5 D	€#		07/3	: 79	W	05
13937				MH LE						DABOO	5 S	YS,		08/0	. 79	7	OC
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2.1846						CAN I			REFORTS	DABOO	•	HL.		08/0			OC
75645									MILYSIS	DABOO		HL		0870			oc
7.542									DE P D.	DAEOO		Ht_		08/0			oc
71644	r - c	0.46							MALSE IFE			<b>&gt;</b> ₹1_		08/0			OC.
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0002									TRETED		_	MMO		08/1			oc
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50013	DC 5	-0053							TESTING	DAEOO		URV		08/3 08/3			4
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	DS-S	-0054		OUPPE						DABOO				08/3			3
				OOCAL						DABOO		A		09/0			
50017									FAILS	DABOO		OMM		09/0			оc
S0018	DS-S	-0055							STANDBY	DABOO		YS		09/1			11
				LOONET					AILURE	DABOO		YS		09/1		7	
50022	DS-S	-0058	-0044	DOTAR	PE GR	FF-LI	NE E	RRCP	RECOV	DABOO		YS		09/1			11
50024	DS-S	-0055	-0045	00018	MEN.	TON 5	SITE	ADAP	TATION	DABOO	5 5	A	##	09/1	c 79	7	11
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				3. 00NE						DABOO				05/1			
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				3 06"11 9 07:50						DABOO				09/1			1 1
50047	D2 - 5	1-0069	-0048	G7AD	וו׳ ט	mSGL)	( AS	A U	SER	DABOO	7 M	R	**	09/1	E 79	9	11

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The second secon		
199048 DS-S-0070 0046 03DFEFTE SEV. USERS	DAB007	NI1 ##09/.1 79 11
- 10049 DS 5-0077-0055 00MUNT BUILD COV MAP SITES, 2, 3		SA ##09/2 79 11
50050 DS-5 0078-0048 0910 ADD COMMONS TO THRESKY	DARGO7	AFARS ##69/2: 79 11
50032 DS-8 0072-0050 000 PEATE SITE ADAPT SITE 3	DAE 006	85 ##09/1 '79 11
NOOS DES GO73-GOST COUREATE WITE ADAPT SITE 3	DABOO6	SA ##09/2 79 11
-0024 DS-C 0074 GGS2 OOCHEATE SITE ADAPT SITE 3	SALOOP	SA ##09/2 75 11
50051 DS-S-0079-0056 GOSURVEY RANGE CHG FOR SITE 3		SA ##09/1 79 11
50052 DS-S-0080-0048 10CHANGE SUURCE - DABOO7	DAEO07	DRV ##09/21 /9 11
1,0053 DS S 0081-0048 11CHANGE VARIABLE - FABOUT	DABGO7	CM ##09/21 79 11
50054 DS-S-0082-0057 OCCHIG FRAME TABLE FOR SITE 2	DAL006	SA ##09/2- 79 11
SUOSB DS-S-0084-0048 12CHANGE BLOCK DATA 'CDTYPX'	DABO07	SYS **09/2: 79 11
50060 DS-S-0085-0048 13IMPRUMER FLOCK SETTINGS	DAB007	DEX ##09/E: 79 11
50085 DS-S 0091 0048 15PELEASE 7 COLDSTART	DAE007	SYS ##09/2 79 11
SOOKS DS-5-0090-0062 OOAS POWER 215 SEC DOESN'T WK	DAE006	SYS ##09/2 79 11
50061 DS S-0086 0059 OGSTORAGE YELLOW ST PROBLEM	0003±3	PM ##09/2- 79 11
SUG67 DS-S-0158-0038 OGNEED TO INSERT PATCHES	L45001	SYS 10/C 79 5C
	DAEOO7	CUMM ##10/C. 79 1
SGO70 DS S-0099-0061 COMUST GENERATE M-SITE MAPS	DV5009	SA ##10/0- 79 11
50062 DS-S-0087-0060 COTPIXIX SOME BIAS NOT RESTRD		PM ##10/G- 79 11
NOCO1 UD MISSING F/B BIT	D45009	SURV 10/0- 79 00
14002 UD TIME OF EATED @ SCAN RATE	D4B006	SURV 10/5- 79 00
NOOD JD FLWOOD F/G BIT INCORRECT	DABOO6	SURV 10/04 79 OC
50102 DS-S 0092-0063 GOMULTIPLE CANCEL DATA FEBLM	040006	NM ##10/C= 79 11
SO103 DS S 0009-0069 00 BVW VARIABLE NAME MISSPELL		ATARS ##10/05 79 11
SC107 DS-S 0094-0064 GUMIXUFEXT SENSOR A & B	DAB006	PM ##10/05 79 11
90106 DS S 0100 0070 000R0PCW FAILURE 90106 PMV BRD 1041419 FRORLEM	DAB006 DAB006	ATARS ##10/11 79 11 SYS 10/11 79 00
.0108 DS S-0097-0067 OSBAD TRN # IN CX REGUEST	DAB007	NM ##10/11 79 11
CO112 DS S-0197 COB4 COASSDCIATE/CORRELATE FROBLM	DABOO7	SURV #10/1: 79P 5S
50113 DS 5-0002-0072 001PC DNES NOT COME UP	DAPOO6	PM ##10/1: 79 11
50114 DS S-0101-0071 GGEYCESS BIT COUNT OF 16	DY3009	PM ##10/1: 79 11
SOLIS DS-S-0104-0074 OOPROB SETTING ATCRES ID	DAB006	NM ##10/1: 79 11
SOLIT DE E-0048-0068 OCATERBS LOGIC CONFLICT	DAE006	67ARS ##10/1 79 11
SOLIB DS S CICS 0073 00 CPME CUTRAGEDUS INDICES	DABOO6	PM ##10/22 79 11
40123 DS S 0095-0067 OUTRACK REQUESTING DATA FRBLM		NM ##10/22 79 11
90131 DS 8-0096-0067 O1 MBEIFY NETWRK MGMT	DAEO07	NM ##10/E: 79 11
S0153 DS 8-0109 0076 GOMBDIFY COMM DRIVER	DAB006	DRV ##10/30 79 11
56134 DS-8-0106-0067 03 COMMON & FLOCK CHANGES	DAB007	NM ##10/3: 79 11
5 1175 DS S-0105-0075 00 AIMITH FIAS	D42006	SA ##11/C1 79 11
CO135 DE SHOTIO-0049 1700FHECT TILINE TIMEOUT	DABOOT	SA ##11/05 79 11
F0137 DE S-0111-0048 ISUFDATE COMM BLOCK	DAB007	DEX ##11/02 79 11
90139 DS: 5:0127:0048 SSFAILURE TELEFHONE LINES	DAEOO7	PM ##11/11 79 11
90140 DS S-0112 0048 19ADD TIME & SCAN MARKERS	DABO07	NM ##11/11 79 11
S0142 - JAS DUMP OF FROC 0	D48007	DEX 11/1c 79 OC
50057 DS-5-0125-0648 28ADDITION OF USERS	DABOO7	
74331 DS 5-0129-0048 29 ADDITION MID/FDAS	DAEO07	MTD 11/21 79 50
50143 DS S-0113-0048 20TEST MESSAGES FATH WRONG	D46007	NM ##11/2: 79 11
SC144 DS-S-0114 0067 051PC MARK CORRECTION	DABO07	SA ##11/31 79 11
SO145 DS S 0115-0067 GEMULT TRE INITIATIONS	DABO07	SURV ##11/3: 79 11
50146 DS-5-0116-0067 07CFEATION NEW CAL CURVE	PABO07	SA ##11/31 79 11

1 :				TROUBLE HERO				EET 5	;
TRO	CHG PRUP		TIP	DESCRIPTION		PROD	PART N	0 000	
	DC S 0108	-0067	O41NTI BE	ACE PHOBLEM		DAEO07	SURV	##12/L.	79 11
	DS 5 0117					DABOO7	SURV	##12/6-	
				G TO CHAMNEL	MGMT	DABOO7	CM	##12/54	
				ELEASE ERROR		DABO07		-12/0:	
				TION NETWORK			NM	##12/C*	
				STINATION MI		DAB007	PM	##12/1	
50153	DS-5 0121	- 0048	111MPLEM	ENT CHANGE A	TARS	DAB007	CHALA	*12/11	75M10
50158	DS-S-0123	0048	24ILLEGA	L SENSOR STA	TUS	DABG07	MM	##12/11	79 11
50154	-	SNS		EPLIES LOCKO		DADOO7	NM	##12/1-	79 1
50156	DS~5-0122	-0048	23TRK CO	ORDINATION M	ESSAGE	DABOO7	MII	<b>412/1</b> *	79MIO
90157	_	SNS	FADE C	F MIZPAH		DAB007	SURV	##12/1+	79 1
50159	DS-S-0148	-0003	OO CONDI	TIONS REMOTE	DATA	DAB007	NM	12/1+	791110
50161	DS~S-0124	-004B	. 25NM 2-1	TRANSITION		DABO07	NM	##12/14	79 11
50163	=	SNS	DABS T	ARGETS DUISI	DE COV	DAEO07	NM	##12/1+	79 1
50184	DS-5-0139	-0067	16CHANGE	D LCF FILES		DABO07		##01/21	80 11
				RECT ACTRES H			SURV	##12/C+	79 11
				OF CONN SEN			PM	##01/.:	80 11
				LL-10-COAST			MIL	##G1/C	80 11
				STOP WITH ZER		EABO07	NM	##01/1.	
50180	DS-5-0140	-0049	BOREQ F	OR PRIM IN	CENT CELL	DA8007	IJM	<b>→</b> 01/1	
				1GT HI CON TE		D4B007	NIT	##01/0	80 3
				ISITE ADAFTAT		DABO07	SA	##01/0	
				.CAD COMM & D			IIM	##12/25	
				S FOR UNLK L			NM	##12/25	
				CABS DUE TO		DABO07	NM	##12/5.	
				ROLL-CALL R		DABOO6	CM	##12/21	
				SS TRACK HANG		DABO07	SURV		SOM 7
		-0019		T/PACK_RADAR			CM	*01/2:	
50255				OF DATA ON M			COMM		FOG OS
				BIT IN SURVET		DABO07	SURV		BOW 7
				R IN DOWNLINK			CM		60W 7
				NG ALL-CALL S		DABCO7	CM		60M10
				BIAS REGISTER		DAB007	SYS		80W 55
				TED CAL CURVE		DABOO7	SA CUDU		80M10
				WR TESTS FOR			SURV		80M10
				EMENT INTERIM		DABOOB	MARS	+05/04	
				ESTED SOFTWR		DABOO7	MTD		BOB 55
				L SENSOR SECO		DAB007	NM		80W 7
		7-0003		EM SPECIAL MC ARTING ARIES	IDE FLAG	DABOQ7	NM		80W 7
N2001					COSTS	DAB005	SURV		20B 05
50217				OF ATCRES TA BS REM TRK DA		DAB007	SURV		80W 0S
50210		7_0004		R DISSEM OF C			NM COMM		805 05 806 55
							COMM		
				I COMM BUFF E FAIL TO CHK		DABOO7	COMM		80G 55
				GING EXT DATA		DAROO7	COMM		80G 5S
				GING EXT DATA NEL MGT INTER			NM Ba	##01/22	
						DAB007	SA		80M10
				K ALERT MESSA LINK SWITCH		DABOO6 DABOO7	NM SA		805 4S
				ILE ERROR IN			SYS		80G 55
DU210	2 N2-2-0126	2-0016	, oo comp	THE FULL TH	DABOUG RE	LDW800/	<b>515</b>	#U2/2"	SOM 55

1	SOF	TWARE TROUBLE REPURTS - DAG	1007	SI	EET 6		:
t							:
TIRM CHG PRUP # IN	 1 T	DESCRIPTION	PRUD	PART I	NO. UPE		 51:
				<u>-</u> -			
MG009 DS-N-000A-0011	00	TEST 28 RUN 4 LOCKOUT PROB	DARGOZ	NM	03/17	905	٠.
		DABS LUCKOUT PROB	DAB007	NM	##GJ/1 <sup>-</sup>	80	1
		NAFEC REG FOR PRIMARY	DABOO7	NM	03/1	80	4
		PCPF STILL SET	DAB007	NM	##03/1		1
		LATRA PROCESS-SPEC MODE	DAB007	NM	+03/1		414
N0026	JΒ	SF UPDATE	DAB007	NM	##03/2:	80	1
NG027 DS:N:0009-0003	00	COMM RESPONSE PROBLEM	DAB007	DL	##03/2.		3
50251 DS-S 0162-0013	00	UNCONNECTED SENSOR FLAD	DAB007	NM	03/21		
50257 DS-S 01&1 0012	00	DISABLE AI RÉGUEST	DABO07	MI	03/2:		55
50249 DS-D-0164-0016	00	INCUR BIAS REG SET IN CIDIN	DABOO7	COMM	03/1~	-05	55
50254 DS-S-0163-0015	00	SITE ADAPTATION UPGRADES	DABG07	SA	03/2~	# Jh	55
		TRANSMITTER OVERLOAD ON ELM	1DAB007	CM	03/2:	£0∟	٥s
N1006	ƙS	MCU PARITY ERROR	DABOG7	PM	03/15	೯೮೯	ÚS
		TARGET REPTS	DABO07	SURV	03/2:	BCE	05
		SENSOR STOPS INTERROGATING		CM	03/21	60	5C
		LOSS OF DATALINK MSG-AIRCR		DL	*03/E:	80	411
110050 D2-N-0018-0058			DABG07	DL	*03/£:	80	411
	_	DISSEMINATING "A" CODE	DABOO7	SURV	03/2:	AUB	
		COR OF FRUIT REPLIES	DAB007	SURV	<b>*</b> 03/21	∃ć	2
		DISSEM OF ALT OF ZERO	DABO07	SURV	03/2:		
		LOSS OF REPTS TO ATC FACIL		SURV	03/2:		OS
		BAD REPTS BEING DISSEM	DABO07	SURV	03/2:		25
		NM HANG PROXIMITY TEST	DABO07	NM	04/02		55
		ATARS VSL DESIGN ERROR	DABO07	AJARS	04/03		5A
		FRROR IN ATARS SIMULATOR	DABO07	ATARS	04/03		2
		ATARS EPOCH CYCLE CHANGE	DABO07	ATARS	04/03		5A
		3 COMP FAIL CAUSES 4TH FAIL		SYS	11/14		os
		CODE SWAPFING LOGIC WRONG	DABOO7	SURV	⇒04/0E		55
		DOUBLE DABS REPORTS GEN	DABOO7	SURV	04/02		05
_		INCREASE OF ATCRBS TRACKS S.F. TIME	DAB007	SURV	04/07		os
		UPDATED RADAR REINF. BIT	DAB007 DAB007	SURV	+03/31		5
		IMPROVED SITE ADAPT TECH	DABOOR	SURV	04/15		os
		UNEXPECTED PRIMARY REQUEST	_	SY <b>S</b> NM	*04/1c		5S 3
N0038 DS-N-0013-0026.			DABO07	NM	+04/15		ت 55
		SENSOR DROPPED INTERROGAT	DAB007	CM	04/16		05
		COMM PROBLEM	DABO07	DL	04/1:		05
		SITE AD FOR LOD TAP CONSOL		SA	*04/16		1
NG034 DE N-0014-0027			DABO07	NM		30	÷N
		FAADAB CELL CHANGE	DAB007	NM	##03/3:		1
		CONNECTIVITY PROBLEM	DAB007	NM	##04/1:	80	i
		S F. UPDATE	DAB007	SURV	##04/20		i
		USF PROBLEM	DAB007	NM	##04/1:		i
		NEW CAL CURVE - ELWOOD	DAB007	8A	04/1é		55
		IPC M SITE ADJ SITE DEF	DAB007	SA	04/0E		55
		SYMBOLS DISAPPEAR FROM STC		RDAS	+04/22		55
		COLD START-GMBILD ON TAPE	DABOOB	SYS	+04/24		55
N0039	ΕM	RADAR ONLY DROPOUT ON STC	DABO07	RDAS	##04/22		1
50250 DS-5-0177-0006	00	MODIFY CM RTNS	DABO07	CM	04/22	60	5C
50272 DS-S-0176 0005	00	ERROR IN DISSEMMODE 4	DABOQ7	SURV	04/22	90	50

1			·	
į	30	LIMARE TROUBLE REPORTS - DAT	1002	SHEET 7
	<b></b>			:
TRW CHG PRUP W	INIT	DESCRIPTION		
	<b>.</b> .			
		SURV TRANSMIT ERR - MODE 4		COMM 04 11 69 50
102/3 DS-5 01/4-0	003 00	HANG IN COURSE SCREEN	DAB007	PM 04/13 50 50
50275 D5-5-0172-0	001 00		DAB007	PM 04/11 20 50
(0275 DS-S-0173-0	202.00	BAD BIAS REG REMOTE DATA ACTIVE FLAG	DABOO7	PM 04/21 80 50 NM #04/21 805 55
		NOTIFY ATARS OF ATC SENSER		NM #04/20 805 55 PM #04/20 805 55
00580		LOST SURV. DUR. ELM UPLINK		CM +04/2: 80 2
50282		ELM 209 SCENAFIO PROBLEM	DAB007	CM 05/0. 809 05
		PROC SKIPPED-ATCHBS/ATCHBS		AJARS +05/C. 80W 7
50287 DS-S-0180-0			DAB007	PM +05/C1 85W 7
		PREMATURE DATA REG CANC	DABO07	NM +05/11 805 55
110044		MESSAGE EXPIRATION	DAP007	DL ##05/0° 80 1
140045	JD	COMM SCENARIO PROBLEM	DAROOZ	DL 05/0: 506 05
CG002	JD	ZENITH CONE PROBLEM	DAB007	SURV +05/15 80 2
A0007 DS A-0008-0	00 400	ZENITH CONE PROBLEM RESPONSIVE GENERATOR	DABCOB	ATARS +05/2: 80 5N
A0006 DS-A-0007-0	005 00	DETECTOR DATA CEM DATA RDAS WEATHER REPORTS	DABOOB	ATARS +05/11 SC 5N
40005 DE-A-0005-0	004 00	CEM DATA	B006AG	ATARS #05/11 80 5N
				MTD +05/15 8C% 7
CC004		RADAR REPORT DISLEMINATION	DAB007	SURV +05/1: 80 1
NO046		ATCRES FRUIT REJECTION	DAE007	SURV 05/15 80A 08
110047		ATERBS FRUIT REJECTION	DABOO7	SURV 05/19 804 05
50296		INCORRECT DASS TRACK INIT.		SURV 05/2, 802 0S
N0049		ALL-CALL LOCKOUT FROBLEM	C46007	NM ##05/15 80 1
NG050	_	USF PROBLEM	DABOO7	NM #05/17 60E 55
1.0051		SENSOR STATUS FROBLEM	DABOO7	AML ##05/1F E0 1
N0052 N0053		AC ACGUIRE FROBLEM	DAB007	NM 05/11 E0E 05
		DATA REGUEST ALTITUDE DATA IN MESSAGES	DAEGO7	NM +05/1F E0 3
NG054		ANTENNA FACE PROBLEM	DABOOB	ATARS #05/1E 50 5N
NG057		ATCRBS FADAR FANGE MASK	E4B007	SURV +05/19 80 2 CM ##05/2, 80 1
50297 DS-S-0190-0			DAB007	CM ##05/2.80 1 CM +05/2=80#7
		NOT HANDLING ILLEGAL OP	DABOO7	SYS +05/2° 80k 7
NG060		COMMAND ERROR	DAB007	DEX +06/01 80 1
		DETECT AND RESOLUTION CHNG		ATARS +05/22 80 5N
N0059		DAAT INITIATION	DAB007	NM ##05/27 80 1
		ATC FAILURE MESSAGES	DABOOB	PM +05/CI 805 58
503 <b>03</b>		ATCRBS PROCESSING	D4B007	SURV 06/04 80H 05
N1025		INCORRECT V.R. WEA MAP	D4B007	*06/12 EUP 05
110055		WWVB SYCHRONIZATION	DABO07	*05/2: EDL OS
N0058	LM	REFLECTOR FILES	DAB007	+05/2E EC ON
503 <b>05</b>	BW	SIZE OVERFLOW FOR SSOOAX	DABOOB	ATARS +06/CE EDW OS
50 <b>219</b>	BW	DABGOB CHANGES	DABOOB	*02/21 E0 Z
50 <b>310</b>	BW	INCORRECT BLOCK DATA INIT	DABOOB	PM +06/12 EOH OS
503 <b>09</b>	MB	ATCRBS CORR AT NM	DABO07	SURV +06/1: 20A 0S
N1023		NO FADAR FALSE TGTS	DABO07	SURV #06/10 808 OS
50304		DATAPASE KLUDGE	DABOOB	MTD #06/C4 EOM 55
A0010		PROX MESSAGE	DABOOB	ATARS #05/27 50 5N
50306			DABOOB	*06/05 2CM 5S
50301		ELM TRANSPONDER PROBLEMS	DABO07	
503 <b>00</b>	BG	ELM PROBLEMS	DABO07	CM +05/2F 20 2

· • • 18	тирскулц	C PROGRAM	(DRFF) VIR 1 UI	UV 114	44 0//	677110	1 AUE	9•
:		SOFT		fts - 104	1100	SHI	err 8	•
ITRN	CHG PRUP	W INIT	DESCRIPTION		6800	PART N	O DEE	· •1:
N3063		HC 4	EN HESTS COASTS		5,48007	1.00	•06/1:	. 1.
MO082			RIES ECLNARIO PRUI				•06/1:	
A0011			MANEYVER CONFLICT				*96/1°	
308			ENDOR INTERNAL DEL				# Ot/:	
		• • • • •	STATUS CODE CV			•	3,77	, , , , , ,
	STATUS		DESCRIPTION		พบสย	ER		
	00	TROUBLE	REPORT SUBMITHED		j	9		
	01	LUCAL MA	MAGER DISAFFROVED	CLOSE	D 5	7		
	05	AWAITING	JCCB ACTION			8		
	03	UCCB D15	AFFROVED CLOSED			8		
	04	JOCE PLA	CED ON HOLD			7		
	05	ACCB AFT	ROVED AND ASSIGNED	)	5	5		
	06		ATLED RETURN TO			0		
	67		ELEAGED TO STAGING	G LIBRAR	Υ 1	3		
	08		ARED I & T			0		
	09		CAPPENDVAL FUR LACE			0		
	10		HOVED FOR BALLINE	_	1	-		
	11		N DATELINE CLOUP		1 1	7		
		INVALIL:	STATUS CODE A STA			0		
				TUTAL	35	4		